ADManager Plus Build < 7210 Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability## ADManager Plus Build < 7210 Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability
## Description
The `Modify Computers` is a predefined role in ADManager for managing computers. If a technician user has the `Modify Computers` privilege over a computer can change the `userAccountControl` and `msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo` attributes of the computer object. In this way, the technician user can set `Constrained Kerberos Delegation` over any computer within the Organizational Unit that the user was delegated.<br>
Contrary to what ADManager claims the user who has the `Modify Computers` role can change the privilege of computer objects in the Active Directory. The `Constrained Kerberos Delegation` can be set for any service such as CIFS, LDAP, HOST services. Then the user can access these services by abusing the `Constrained Kerberos Delegation`. In addition, the `Unconstrained Kerberos Delegation` can be set over the computer objects by changing the `userAccountControl` attribute.
Normally, only users that have `SeEnableDelegationPrivilege` privilege can set constrained kerberos delegation. Only members of the `BUILTIN\Administrators` group have this privilege by default. The delegated user for an Organizational Unit can not set constrained kerberos delegation even if a user has the `GenericAll` right over a computer account, so the delegation process in Active Directory does not grant this privilege. However, the technician user can use the `SeEnableDelegationPrivilege` right via the `Modify Computers` role.<br>
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## Vulnerability reasons:
1. ADMP Web App Authorization issue: Assigning a predefined `Modify Computers` role delegates the technician user to modify custom attributes of computers unexpectedly. Even though it appears that this privilege is not granted in the UI, the `Additional Custom Attribute` property is assigned and this leads to broken access control vulnerability.
3. There is no restriction for editing the `userAccountControl` and `msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo` attributes of the computer objects. The ADMP application performs changes with domain admin privileges as designed so that if we can bypass some restrictions (e.g. format of attribute value), our requests are applied with domain admin privileges. This way we can edit the attributes `userAccountControl` and `msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo`.
## Impact
A technician user elevates privileges from `Domain User` to `Domain Admin`. For example, the user can set `Constrained Kerberos Delegation` over `CLIENT1$` for the `CIFS` service of the domain controller and access the `CIFS` service. As a result, the user is delegated to manage `CLIENT1$` but he can access the `CIFS` service of the domain controller impersonating a user unexpectedly.
## PoC - 1
If a user has local admin right over a computer and can manage this computer with the “Modify Computers” role in ADManager:
https://github.com/passtheticket/CVE-2024-24409/assets/76125965/e2e7accd-f66c-4ae3-981e-0b10e700e4ba
## PoC - 2
If a user can add a computer to Active Directory (MAQ, delegation) or obtain NT hash of the computer account (dumping hash) and manage this computer with the “Modify Computers” role:
https://github.com/passtheticket/CVE-2024-24409/assets/76125965/95de0d26-c144-485e-924d-714b8de2c15e
[4.0K] /data/pocs/3d8a509501973e4fc1f26afeedb320a6b5b59af1
└── [3.2K] README.md
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