CVE-2014-0160 PoC — OpenSSL 缓冲区错误漏洞

Description

A research tool designed to check for OpenSSL CVE-2014-0160 vulnerability

Readme

heartbleed
==========

A simple tool written in Ruby wich allow testing your servers for OpenSSL CVE-2014-0160 vulnerability.

## Disclaimer

**I will not be taken responsible for the damage that could be done using this tool. It was written to check private servers for a precise vulnerability and measure potential user-related data leakages under high traffic. It is shared as a tool for internal security auditing.**

## Dependencies

Requires :

- Ruby
- Bundler

In order to install these prerequisites, first download and install ruby for your plateform.
Then install Bundler, with the command ```gem install bundler ``` and retrieve project dependencies by running ```bundle install``` in the project root directory.


## Usage

The command line synopsis is ```ruby src/run.rb <host> [<port>]```

If your server does not appear to be vulnerable, the ouptut will look like this :

<pre>
Host server:443 seems safe
</pre>

By contrast if it is vulnerable, the ouput will display about 64 Kib of data stolen from memory and shown as a hexadecimal dump so you can check if sensible information disclosure could have happened or not.

<pre>
Host server:443 is vulnerable! Heartbeat response payload :
00000000  d4 03 03 53 4a 84 a9 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08  |...SJ...........|
00000010  09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18  |................|
00000020  19 1a 1b 00 01 a6 00 00 00 01 00 02 00 03 00 04  |................|
00000030  00 05 00 06 00 07 00 08 00 09 00 0a 00 0b 00 0c  |................|
00000040  00 0d 00 0e 00 0f 00 10 00 11 00 12 00 13 00 14  |................|
00000050  00 15 00 16 00 17 00 18 00 19 00 1a 00 1b 00 1c  |................|
00000060  00 1d 00 1e 00 1f 00 20 00 21 00 22 00 23 00 24  |....... .!.".#.$|
00000070  00 25 00 26 00 27 00 28 00 29 00 2a 00 2b 00 2c  |.%.&.'.(.).*.+.,|
00000080  00 2d 00 2e 00 2f 00 30 00 31 00 32 00 33 00 34  |.-.../.0.1.2.3.4|
....
</pre>

#### Note about stolen chunks size

Per RFCs [6520](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6520#section-4) and [6066](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6066#section-4), the maximum Heartbeat message size should be either ![equation](http://latex.codecogs.com/gif.latex?2^{9}), ![equation](http://latex.codecogs.com/gif.latex?2^{10}), ![equation](http://latex.codecogs.com/gif.latex?2^{11}), ![equation](http://latex.codecogs.com/gif.latex?2^{12}) or ![equation](http://latex.codecogs.com/gif.latex?2^{14}) bytes depending on the use of the Maximum Fragment Length extension or not.

Quoting RFC 6520 :
>The total length of a HeartbeatMessage MUST NOT exceed 2^14 or max_fragment_length when negotiated as defined in RFC 6066.

Quoting RFC 6066 :
>The "extension_data" field of this extension SHALL contain:

>     enum{
>          2^9(1), 2^10(2), 2^11(3), 2^12(4), (255)
>      } MaxFragmentLength;

>   whose value is the desired maximum fragment length.  The allowed
>   values for this field are: 2^9, 2^10, 2^11, and 2^12.


This means, the maximum chunk size of stolen data should be about 16 Kib. However, OpenSSL does not honor this constraint, allowing to use the Heartbeat message payload length field maximum value i.e. 65535 (0xFFFF).

File Snapshot

Remarks