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CVE-2025-48543 PoC — Google Android 安全漏洞

Source
Associated Vulnerability
Title:Google Android 安全漏洞 (CVE-2025-48543)
Description:In multiple locations, there is a possible way to escape chrome sandbox to attack android system_server due to a use after free. This could lead to local escalation of privilege with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation.
Description
PoC exploit for CVE-2025-48543 in C++
Readme
# CVE-2025-48543 Exploit: Android ART Use-After-Free Vulnerability

This repository contains a C++ exploit for CVE-2025-48543, a critical use-after-free vulnerability in the Android Runtime (ART) component of Android versions 13 through 16. This exploit demonstrates how a malicious application can escape the Chrome sandbox and escalate privileges to the `system_server` process, which is highly privileged within the Android operating system.

## Table of Contents

1. [Introduction](#introduction)
2. [Vulnerability Overview](#vulnerability-overview)
3. [Exploit Details](#exploit-details)
4. [Prerequisites](#prerequisites)
5. [Code Explanation](#code-explanation)
6. [Real-World Considerations](#real-world-considerations)
7. [License](#license)

## Introduction

CVE-2025-48543 is a use-after-free vulnerability in the Android Runtime (ART) component, discovered by Google's Threat Analysis Group. This flaw allows a malicious application to escape the Chrome sandbox and escalate privileges to the `system_server` process, effectively compromising the entire device. Exploitation of this vulnerability can lead to full device compromise without requiring user interaction.

## Vulnerability Overview

### Affected Versions

- Android 13
- Android 14
- Android 15
- Android 16

### Impact

- Local privilege escalation
- Bypass of Android sandbox
- Elevated privileges
- Potential for persistent malware installation

### Mitigation

Google addressed CVE-2025-48543 in the September 2025 Android Security Bulletin. Users are strongly advised to update their devices to the latest security patch level to mitigate this vulnerability.

## Exploit Details

This exploit involves several steps:

1. **Triggering the Use-After-Free Vulnerability**: Allocate and free a large chunk of memory to create a dangling pointer.
2. **Heap Spraying**: Fill the freed memory with controlled data to overwrite critical ART structures.
3. **Compromising `system_server`**: Use Binder to communicate with the `system_server` process and inject shellcode.
4. **Shellcode Execution**: Execute arbitrary code in the context of the `system_server` process.

## Prerequisites

- Android device running Android 13 through 16 (not updated to the September 2025 security patch level)
- JNI development environment
- Android NDK

## Code Explanation

### 1. Triggering the Use-After-Free Vulnerability

```cpp
jclass cls = env->FindClass("java/lang/String");
jmethodID mid = env->GetMethodID(cls, "<init>", "([B)V");
jbyteArray byteArray = env->NewByteArray(0x1000000);
jobject strObj = env->NewObject(cls, mid, byteArray);
env->DeleteLocalRef(strObj);
env->DeleteLocalRef(byteArray);
env->DeleteLocalRef(cls);
```

- This code creates a large Java `String` object and then frees it, leaving a dangling reference in the ART heap.
- The `DeleteLocalRef` function is used to simulate garbage collection and memory reuse.

### 2. Heap Spraying / Memory Manipulation

```cpp
jbyteArray byteArray2 = env->NewByteArray(0x1000000);
void *controlled_memory = env->GetPrimitiveArrayCritical(byteArray2, NULL);
memcpy(controlled_memory, &malicious_pointer, sizeof(malicious_pointer));
env->ReleasePrimitiveArrayCritical(byteArray2, controlled_memory, 0);
```

- This part of the code demonstrates heap spraying by allocating another large array and manipulating its memory.
- The `GetPrimitiveArrayCritical` and `ReleasePrimitiveArrayCritical` functions are used to safely manipulate the memory.
- The malicious data is crafted to overwrite vtable or method pointers, allowing for arbitrary code execution.

### 3. Compromising `system_server`

```cpp
sp<IBinder> binder = ProcessState::self()->getContextObject(NULL);
binder->transact(0xDEADBEEF, data, &reply);
```

- This code uses the Binder IPC mechanism to communicate with the `system_server` process.
- A transaction is sent to the `system_server` process, and the controlled data is extracted from the reply.
- The shellcode is then executed in the context of the `system_server` process.

### 4. Shellcode Execution

```cpp
void (*shellcode)() = (void (*)())(controlled_data);
shellcode();
```

- This is a placeholder for the actual shellcode that would be executed in the context of the `system_server` process.
- In a real-world exploit, this shellcode would be more complex and tailored to the specific vulnerabilities and protections of the target system.

## Real-World Considerations

- **Timing and Layout**: In a real exploit, the timing and layout of memory allocations and deallocations are crucial. The exploit must ensure that the freed memory is reallocated in a controlled way.
- **Security Mitigations**: Modern Android devices have several security mitigations in place, such as ASLR, SELinux, and memory protections (NX, PIE). A real exploit would need to bypass these protections.
- **Chaining Exploits**: Often, exploiting CVE-2025-48543 requires chaining it with other vulnerabilities, such as kernel bugs, to achieve full device compromise.

## License

This project is licensed under the MIT License. See the [LICENSE](LICENSE) file for more details.

---

*Feel free to contribute, report issues, or suggest improvements!*
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