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CVE-2025-56801 PoC — Reolink desktop application 安全漏洞

Source
Associated Vulnerability
Title:Reolink desktop application 安全漏洞 (CVE-2025-56801)
Description:The Reolink Desktop Application 8.18.12 contains hardcoded credentials as the Initialization Vector (IV) in its AES-CFB encryption implementation allowing attackers with access to the application environment to reliably decrypt encrypted configuration data. NOTE: the Supplier's position is that material is not hardcoded and is instead randomly generated on each installation of the application.
Description
AES-CFB IV Generation Vulnerability in Reolink Desktop Application
Readme
# CVE-2025-56801
### AES-CFB IV Generation Vulnerability in Reolink Desktop Application
## 1. Overview

<img src="images/reolink-icon.png" alt="Reolink Icon" align="left" width="150" hspace="10"/>
<br clear="left"/>

- **Name**: Reolink Desktop Application
- **Version**: 8.18.12
- **Vendor**: Reolink
- **CWE**: [CWE-1204: Generation of Weak Initialization Vector (IV)](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/1204.html), [CWE-321: Use of Hard-coded Cryptographic Key](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/321.html)
- **CVSS**: 5.1 MEDIUM
- **Vector String**: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:L
## 2. Summary
The Reolink Desktop Application (version 8.18.12) uses the AES-CFB algorithm to encrypt configuration files and other sensitive data.  

However, the Initialization Vector (IV) used in this process is handled improperly, leading to a vulnerability where encrypted configuration data can be easily decrypted by an attacker.

## 3. Details
The following code shows that the IV is generated dynamically at runtime:
```javascript
{
  key: "fetchAesIv",
  value: function () {
    return window.napiDecrypt.getAesIv();
  },
}
```
However, the value returned is always the same string: `bcswebapp1234567`.

This means that although the IV is technically generated at runtime, it is effectively hardcoded, providing no additional security.  

## 4. Proof of Concept (PoC)
While the application is running, the IV value can be retrieved dynamically via the DevTools JavaScript console.  

The `window.napiDecrypt.getAesIv()` function returns a Promise that resolves to a constant string `bcswebapp1234567`.  

![PoC](images/reolink-poc.png)

This demonstrates that the IV is reused across all encryption operations, violating cryptographic best practices.

## 5. Recommendations
In block cipher modes such as CFB, CBC, and OFB, reusing an IV can allow an attacker to predict ciphertext patterns, ultimately compromising data confidentiality. To fulfill the purpose of an IV, a new, unpredictable value must be dynamically generated.

## 6. References
- https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2025-56801
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-56801
- https://github.com/shinyColumn/CVE-2025-56799
- https://github.com/shinyColumn/CVE-2025-56802
File Snapshot

[4.0K] /data/pocs/0adee577dd4aec20b92cb82cd7bf22a762fceba0 ├── [4.0K] images │   ├── [4.9K] reolink-icon.png │   └── [ 40K] reolink-poc.png └── [2.2K] README.md 2 directories, 3 files
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