Bug 2445762 (CVE-2026-3832) - gnutls: Security bypass allows acceptance of revoked server certificates via crafted OCSP response 漏洞概述 gnutls 在匹配 stapled ocsp 响应时，通过扫描 SingleResponse 记录来匹配服务器证书，但随后无条件读取 cert_status 字段。当多记录 ocsp 响应中 stapled 的记录 #0 对应的是不同的证书（good），而服务器证书对应的匹配记录在后面（revoked）时，启用了 ocsp 验证的客户端可能会接受一个已被吊销的服务器证书。这表现为针对同一吊销服务器证书的订单依赖的接受/拒绝结果。 影响范围 产品: Security Response 组件: vulnerability 版本: unspecified 硬件: All 操作系统: Linux 优先级: low 严重程度: low 修复方案 报告时间: 2026-03-09 13:57 UTC by OSIDB Bzimport 修改时间: 2026-04-30 17:30 UTC OC List: 8 users 克隆: 无 环境: 无 最后关闭: 无 Embargoed: 无 附件 描述: gnutls matches a stapled ocsp response to the server certificate by scanning SingleResponse records, but then reads cert_status from record index 0 unconditionally. When a multi-record ocsp response is stapled such that record #0 is for a different certificate (good) and the matching record for the server certificate is later (revoked), a client with ocsp verification enabled can accept a revoked server certificate. This is observable as an order-dependent accept/reject outcome for the same revoked server certificate.