Linux ocfs2 bounds checking fix for out-of-bounds access in xattr

From this webpage screenshot, the following key information about the vulnerability can be obtained: 1. Vulnerability Description: - Title: ocfs2: add bounds checking to ocfs2_xattr_find_entry() - Description: Adds a paranoia check to ensure that during scanning of ocfs2 xattr, memory access does not exceed valid memory regions. This prevents out-of-bounds access when processing crafted images. 2. Patch Source: - Upstream commit: 9e3041fecd8f78a5900c3aa51d3d756e73264d6 - Patch Author: Ferry Meng - Patch Submitter: Greg Kroah-Hartman 3. Patch Content: - File: fs/ocfs2/xattr.c - Changes: - Added bounds checking code to ensure memory access during ocfs2 xattr scanning does not exceed valid memory regions. - Modified the function to include bounds checking logic. 4. Patch Status: - Status: Merged into master branch - Merge Time: 2024-09-30 16:23:50 +0200 5. Patch Dependencies: - Stable dep-of: af77c4fc1871 ("ocfs2: strict bound check before memcmp in ocfs2_xattr_find_entry()") 6. Patch Sign-offs: - Signed-off-by: Ferry Meng - Signed-off-by: Joseph Qi - Signed-off-by: lei lu - Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton 7. Patch Reviews: - Reviewed-by: Mark Fasheh - Reviewed-by: Joel Becker - Reviewed-by: Junxiao Bi - Reviewed-by: Changwei Ge - Reviewed-by: Gang He - Reviewed-by: Jun Piao 8. Additional Sign-off: - Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin This information indicates that the patch addresses a bounds checking vulnerability in the ocfs2 filesystem by adding bounds checking logic to the function to prevent out-of-bounds access. The patch has been reviewed and signed off by multiple developers, ensuring its quality and security.

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Linux ocfs2 bounds checking fix for out-of-bounds access in xattr