CVE-2026-55430— Coder 应用路由信任未认证 X-Forwarded-Host 头导致跨应用数据访问

Coder's subdomain workspace app routing trusts unauthenticated X-Forwarded-Host header, enabling cross-app data access

Coder allows organizations to provision remote development environments via Terraform. Prior to versions 2.29.7, 2.32.7, 2.33.8, and 2.34.2, the workspace app proxy resolves the target app from `httpapi.RequestHost()` which prefers the `X-Forwarded-Host` header over the real `Host` header. No middleware strips `X-Forwarded-Host` before routing and the header is not browser-forbidden so client-side JavaScript can set it on `fetch()` calls. Practical exploitation requires subdomain app routing (wildcard hostname) enabled, a victim who visits the attacker's shared app and a deployment whose upstream proxy does not strip `X-Forwarded-Host`. The fix in versions 2.29.7, 2.32.7, 2.33.8, and 2.34.2 trusts `X-Forwarded-Host` only from configured trusted proxies and otherwise resolves the routing host from the verified request host. As a workaround, place an upstream reverse proxy that strips or overwrites `X-Forwarded-Host` on untrusted requests.

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N

对数据真实性的验证不充分