CVE-2026-44645— harttle liquidjs 资源管理错误漏洞

LiquidJS has a renderLimit DoS guard bypass via empty `{% for %}` body

LiquidJS is a Shopify/GitHub Pages compatible template engine written in pure JavaScript. In versions 10.25.7 and below, the renderLimit option can be fully bypassed by a {% for %} (or {% tablerow %}) tag whose body is empty. The renderLimit option is documented in docs/source/tutorials/dos.md as the mechanism that "mitigates this by limiting the time consumed by each render() call." The per-iteration time check is reached only when the body contains at least one template node, so a template such as {%- for i in (1..N) -%}{%- endfor -%} iterates the full collection without ever consulting renderLimit. With a configured renderLimit of 50 ms, a single parseAndRenderSync call has been observed to consume 2.26 seconds (~45× over the limit) and scales linearly with N up to memoryLimit, allowing a low-privileged template author to wedge an event-loop thread for an attacker-chosen duration. Deployments that rely on a finite renderLimit for DoS protection (common in multi-tenant template-authoring environments) can still be forced by a single crafted template to monopolize a Node.js event-loop worker for attacker-controlled time, potentially stalling in-flight requests, with availability impact only. This issue has been fixed in version 10.26.0.

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

未加控制的资源消耗(资源穷尽)

harttle liquidjs 资源管理错误漏洞

harttle liquidjs是harttle的嵌入式Web服务器。 harttle liquidjs 10.25.7及之前版本存在安全漏洞，该漏洞源于renderLimit选项可被完全绕过，可能导致低权限模板作者占用事件循环线程，造成拒绝服务攻击。

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