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CWE-927 — Vulnerability Class 16

16 vulnerabilities classified as CWE-927. AI Chinese analysis included.

CWE-927 represents a security weakness in Android development where applications transmit sensitive data using implicit intents rather than explicit ones. This vulnerability arises because implicit intents do not specify a target recipient, allowing the Android system to broadcast the data to any installed application that has registered an intent filter for that specific action. Attackers exploit this by installing malicious apps that listen for these broadcasts, thereby intercepting and accessing confidential information such as user credentials or personal details before the intended recipient processes it. To mitigate this risk, developers must strictly use explicit intents when communicating sensitive data, ensuring that the target component is explicitly defined. This approach restricts data transmission to trusted applications, preventing unauthorized interception by untrusted third-party software and maintaining the confidentiality and integrity of the communication channel.

MITRE CWE Description
The Android application uses an implicit intent for transmitting sensitive data to other applications. Since an implicit intent does not specify a particular application to receive the data, any application can process the intent by using an Intent Filter for that intent. This can allow untrusted applications to obtain sensitive data. There are two variations on the standard broadcast intent, ordered and sticky. Ordered broadcast intents are delivered to a series of registered receivers in order of priority as declared by the Receivers. A malicious receiver can give itself a high priority and cause a denial of service by stopping the broadcast from propagating further down the chain. There is also the possibility of malicious data modification, as a receiver may also alter the data within the Intent before passing it on to the next receiver. The downstream components have no way of asserting that the data has not been altered earlier in the chain. Sticky broadcast intents remain accessible after the initial broadcast. An old sticky intent will be broadcast again to any new receivers that register for it in the future, greatly increasing the chances of information exposure over time. Also, sticky broadcasts cannot be protected by permissions that may apply to other kinds of intents. In addition, any broadcast intent may include a URI that references data that the receiving component does not normally have the privileges to access. The sender of the intent can include special …
Common Consequences (2)
ConfidentialityRead Application Data
Other applications, possibly untrusted, can read the data that is offered through the Intent.
IntegrityVaries by Context
The application may handle responses from untrusted applications on the device, which could cause it to perform unexpected or unauthorized actions.
Mitigations (1)
ImplementationIf the application only requires communication with its own components, then the destination is always known, and an explicit intent could be used.
Examples (2)
This application wants to create a user account in several trusted applications using one broadcast intent:
Intent intent = new Intent(); intent.setAction("com.example.CreateUser"); intent.putExtra("Username", uname_string); intent.putExtra("Password", pw_string); sendBroadcast(intent);
Bad · Java
IntentFilter filter = new IntentFilter("com.example.CreateUser"); MyReceiver receiver = new MyReceiver(); registerReceiver(receiver, filter);
Attack · Java
This application interfaces with a web service that requires a separate user login. It creates a sticky intent, so that future trusted applications that also use the web service will know who the current user is:
Intent intent = new Intent(); intent.setAction("com.example.service.UserExists"); intent.putExtra("Username", uname_string); sendStickyBroadcast(intent);
Bad · Java
IntentFilter filter = new IntentFilter("com.example.service.UserExists"); MyReceiver receiver = new MyReceiver(); registerReceiver(receiver, filter);
Attack · Java
CVE IDTitleCVSSSeverityPublished
CVE-2024-3480 Motorola Framework 安全漏洞 — Phones 2.8 Low2024-05-03
CVE-2024-3108 Motorola Time Weather Widget 安全漏洞 — Phones 5.5 Medium2024-05-03
CVE-2023-41828 Motorola Phone 安全漏洞 — Phones 4.4 Medium2024-05-03
CVE-2023-41826 Motorola Device Help 安全漏洞 — Phones 5.1 Medium2024-05-03
CVE-2023-41824 Motorola Phone Calls 安全漏洞 — Phones 2.8 Low2024-05-03
CVE-2023-41820 Motorola Ready For 安全漏洞 — Phones 5.0 Medium2024-05-03
CVE-2023-41817 Motorola Phone Calls 安全漏洞 — Phones 2.8 Low2024-05-03
CVE-2023-44127 Call management - Implicit activity intents disclose contact details and phone numbers — LG V60 Thin Q 5G(LMV600VM) 3.6 Low2023-09-27
CVE-2023-44124 Screen recording - Theft of arbitrary files with system privilege — LG V60 Thin Q 5G(LMV600VM) 6.1 Medium2023-09-27
CVE-2023-44122 LockScreenSettings - Theft arbitrary files with system privilege — LG V60 Thin Q 5G(LMV600VM) 6.1 Medium2023-09-27
CVE-2023-31014 NVIDIA GeForce Now 安全漏洞 — GeForce NOW for Android mobile and TV app 4.2 Medium2023-09-20
CVE-2022-4903 CodenameOne implicit intent for sensitive communication — CodenameOne 5.0 Medium2023-02-10
CVE-2022-36830 SAMSUNG Mobile devices 安全漏洞 — Charm by Samsung 6.2 Medium2022-08-05
CVE-2022-36829 SAMSUNG Mobile devices 安全漏洞 — Charm by Samsung 6.2 Medium2022-08-05
CVE-2022-33734 SAMSUNG Mobile devices 安全漏洞 — Charm by Samsung 6.2 Medium2022-08-05
CVE-2022-33733 SAMSUNG Mobile devices 安全漏洞 — Charm by Samsung 6.2 Medium2022-08-05

Vulnerabilities classified as CWE-927 represent 16 CVEs. The CWE taxonomy describes the weakness; review individual CVEs for product-specific impact.